Security
GigaLoom treats local execution, stored evidence, credentials, network access, and remote-service mutations as separate trust boundaries.
Safety model
- Provider credentials stay in provider-owned homes or explicit secret resolution boundaries.
- Secrets are redacted before persistence, logs, diagnostics, previews, and UI responses.
- Content capture is opt-in.
- Mutating actions require scoped authority where policy demands it.
- Approval binds the exact scope and preview; dispatch revalidates both.
- External commands use explicit arguments, controlled working directories, bounded output, and redacted records.
- Network and GitHub capabilities fail closed unless an exact grant exists.
Do not commit credentials, tokens, .env values, certificates, raw traffic, or
secret-bearing fixtures.
0.9 boundary checks
- Thread Relay binds actor, project, target revision, TTL, idempotency key, and optional active turn before delivery. It admits only a user-role message; agent-proposed content needs an explicit user approval.
- Relay reads are bounded and redacted. Receipts retain content digests, not message text; failed delivery does not rewrite target history.
- Attachment decoding is replacement-free, size-bounded, and binary-aware. Charset evidence contains facts and a digest, never source content.
- Effective Instructions is a project-root-confined, read-only projection. It neither scans private provider homes nor merges/injects rules.
- Gateway launch accepts only reviewed route/profile identities, bounded API-key headers, pinned compatibility evidence, and GigaLoom-managed overlays. Arbitrary URL/header injection, native-home writes, and hidden fallback are denied before provider traffic.
- Product beta evidence is opt-in, local, project-scoped, content-free, and bounded. Export grants no upload or outreach authority.
Unknown, stale, malformed, or mismatched evidence remains a blocker. Do not bypass it by selecting another route or by copying credentials into arguments.
Reporting vulnerabilities
Do not disclose suspected vulnerabilities in a public issue, discussion, or pull request. Follow the repository security policy and use GitHub private vulnerability reporting. Provide a minimal redacted reproduction and never send credentials, user content, native-home data, or raw provider traffic.
The primary security owner is
@krakenalt. The backup maintainer role,
response targets, 2FA gate, and compromised-publisher recovery are defined in
the security and
governance
policies. Public cutover remains blocked until the distinct backup owner has
accepted access.